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One could say that all contemporary academic thought and therefore also all 
media and communication studies is critical because it questions opinions of 
other scholars. This understanding of critique stands in the tradition of Kantian 
enlightenment. Kant argued that modern society is an age of criticism. In 
contrast to Kant’s general understanding of critique, Karl Marx formulated a 
categorical imperative of critical theory—the “categoric imperative to 
overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, neglected, 
contemptible being” (Marx, 1997, p. 257f.). For Marx, the “task of philosophy 
… is to unmask human self-alienation” (Marx, 1997, p. 251). Marx points out a 
more specific understanding of being critical, namely the questioning of 
power, domination and exploitation, and the political demand and struggle for 
a just society. Critical theory is for him a critique of society. Scholars who refer 
to critical theory often mean this second understanding of the notion of 
critique. They employ the term “critical” in order to stress that not all science is 
critical, but that a lot of it has a more administrative character that takes power 
structures for granted, does not question them, or helps legitimatize them.  
 
2. What is critical theory? 
 
Some introductory books to critical theory provide lists of different approaches 
such as the following: Marxist criticism, the Frankfurt School, psychoanalytic 
criticism, feminist criticism, new criticism, reader-response criticism, 
structuralist criticism, deconstructive criticism, new historical and cultural 
criticism, lesbian, gay, and queer criticism, African American criticism, 
postcolonial criticism, cultural studies, etc., structuralism/poststructuralism, 
feminism, post-foundational ethics/politics.  
 
Critical theory is, by other scholars, understood as the works of the Frankfurt 
School, a tradition of critical thinking that originated with the works of scholars 
like Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor W. Adorno. Its starting 
point is the work of Karl Marx. For Horkheimer and his colleagues, critical 
theory “was a camouflage label for ‘Marxist theory’” (Wiggershaus, 1995, p. 5) 
when they were in exile from the Nazis in the United States, where they were 
concerned about being exposed as communist thinkers and therefore took 
care in the categories they employed. There are definitions of critical theory 
that couple the usage of this term exclusively to the Frankfurt School or 
Habermasian Frankfurt School. 
 
<2:> The entry for “Kritische Theorie” (critical theory) in the Europäische 
Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften (European Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy and Science), a four-volume Marxist encyclopedia of philosophy 
edited by Hans Jörg Sandkühler (1990), only provides a cross-reference to 
the entry Frankfurter Schule (Frankfurt School), which means that here one 
assumes an association of the terms “critical theory” and the “Frankfurt 
School.” A second Marxist encyclopedia has taken a different approach. 
Gerhard Schweppenhäuser and Frigga Haug wrote the entry “Kritische 
Theorie” in the Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus (Historical-
Critical Dictionary of Marxism), the largest encyclopedic project of Marxism 
(see http://www.inkrit.de/hkwm/hkwm-index.htm), and defined critical theory 
as  
 
emancipatory social philosophy. It tries to unite in one movement of 
thought the analysis and critique of forms of practice as well as types of 
reason and rationality of bourgeois-capitalist societies since the middle 
of the 19th century until today. Its starting point is Marx’s theory of the 
law of value as the foundation of commodity-producing societies that is 
derived from the analysis of the value-form. This theory is at the same 
time critique of the political economy, i.e. demonstration of the 
capability and limit of this science for the explanation of the value-form 
with its social and ideological consequences. (Schweppenhäuser & 
Haug, 2012, p. 197) 
 
The two authors stress the status of critical theory as critical philosophy and 
critical economics. They understand it as a broad approach that is grounded 
in Karl Marx’s thought and works. However, they also acknowledge that the 
Frankfurt School introduced the term and therefore draw a distinction between 
critical theory as the more general approach and critical theory as the 
Frankfurt School approach.  
 
An approach taken that neither lists approaches nor identifies critical theory 
only with persons associated with the Frankfurt School is to identify 
dimensions of critical theory at the content level. We can identify six 
dimensions of a critical theory: 
 
• critical ethics; 
• critique of domination and exploitation; 
• dialectical reason; 
• ideology critique; 
• critique of the political economy; 
• struggles and political practice. 
 
For grounding an understanding of critical theory that specifies dimensions of 
the critique of society, some foundational texts of the Frankfurt School are 
helpful: Marcuse’s essay Philosophy and Critical Theory (1988, 134–158), 
Horkheimer’s essay Traditional and Critical Theory (2002, 188–252), 
Marcuse’s article The Concept of Essence (1988, 43–87), and the section The 
Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of Society in Marcuse’s book Reason 
and Revolution (1941, 258–322). 
 
Critical theory has a “concern with human happiness” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 135) 
and uses the Hegelian method of comparing essence and existence because 
in capitalism “what <3:> exists is not immediately and already rational” (136). 
This essence can be found in man’s positive capacities (such as striving for 
freedom, sociality, co-operation) and it has the ethical implication that 
universal conditions should be created that allow all humans to realize these 
capacities:  
 
That man is a rational being, that this being requires freedom, and that 
happiness is his highest good are universal propositions whose progressive 
impetus derives precisely from their universality. Universality gives them an 
almost revolutionary character, for they claim that all, and not merely this or 
that particular person, should be rational, free, and happy. (Marcuse, 1988, p. 
152) 
 
Critique of domination and exploitation 
 
Critical theory holds that “man can be more than a manipulable subject in the 
production process of class society” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 153). The goal of 
critical theory is the transformation of society as a whole (Horkheimer, 2002, 
p. 219) so that a “society without injustice” (221) emerges that is shaped by 
“reasonableness, and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness” (222), “in 
which man’s actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own 
decision” (229), and that is “a state of affairs in which there will be no 




In Marx’s works, concepts that describe the existence of capitalism (profit, 
surplus value, worker, capital, commodity, etc.) are dialectical because they 
“transcend the given social reality in the direction of another historical 
structure which is present as a tendency in the given reality” and represent 
the essence of man (Marcuse, 1988, p. 86): 
 
If, for instance, it is said that concepts such as wages, the value of 
labor, and entrepreneurial profit are only categories of manifestations 
behind which are hidden the “essential relations” of the second set of 
concepts, it is also true that these essential relations represent the truth 
of the manifestations only insofar as the concepts which comprehend 
them already contain their own negation and transcendence—the 
image of a social organization without surplus value. All materialist 
concepts contain an accusation and an imperative. (Marcuse, 1988, p. 
86)  
 
Marx’s categories “are negative and at the same time positive” (Marcuse, 
1941, p. 295). 
 
The concepts of contradiction (negation) and negation of the negation are 
crucial for critical theory: In capitalism, every fact is “a negation and restriction 
of real possibilities” (282). “Private property is a fact, but at the same time it is 
a negation of man’s collective appropriation of nature” (Marcuse, 1941, p. 
282).  
 
The historical character of the Marxian dialectic embraces the 
prevailing negativity as well as its negation. … the negation of the 
negation … does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier 
state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men. 
(Marcuse, 1941, p. 315) 
 
The dialectic of capitalism has a structural-objective part: capital 
accumulation’s contradictions result in crisis. These contradictions can only be 
overcome by the subjective force of dialectic: political struggle (Marcuse, 






“Basic to the present form of social organization, the antagonisms of the 
capitalist production process, is the fact that the central phenomena 
connected with this process do not immediately appear to men as what they 
are ‘in reality’, but in masked, ‘perverted’ form” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 70). There 
are different definitions of ideology. Whereas ideology theories define 
ideology in a relatively general sense as worldviews or contested worldviews, 
ideology critique sees it as practice and strategy of those in power for trying to 
guard their interests by presenting reality in a manipulated or distorted 
manner. For the Frankfurt School, a critical concept of ideology requires a 
normative distinction between true and false beliefs and practices. It 
understands ideology as thoughts, practices, ideas, words, concepts, 
phrases, sentences, texts, belief systems, meanings, representations, 
artifacts, institutions, systems, or combinations thereof that represent and 
justify one group’s or individual’s power, domination, or exploitation of other 
groups or individuals by misrepresenting, one-dimensionally presenting or 
distorting reality in symbolic representations. Domination means in this 
context that there is a system that enables one human side to gain 
advantages at the expense of others and to sustain this condition. It is a 
routinized and institutionalized form of asymmetric power, in which one side 
has the opportunity to shape and control societal structures (such as the 
production and control of wealth, political decision-making, public discussions, 
ideas, norms, rules, values), whereas others do not have these opportunities 
and are facing disadvantages or exclusion from the opportunities of others. 
Exploitation is a specific form of domination, in which an exploiting class 
derives wealth advantages at the expense of an exploited class by controlling 
economic resources and means of coercion in such a way that the exploited 
class is forced to produce new use-values that the exploiting class controls. 
Ideology presupposes and comes along with the existence of class societies. 
Put in Hegelian terms, one can say that ideologies claim the class reality of 
society is its natural essence. 
 
Critique of the political economy 
 
Kant’s fundamental philosophical questions about man and his knowledge, 
activities, and hopes (What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I 
hope? What is the human being?) were treated by Marx in the form of a 
philosophy and theory that “demonstrate the concrete forces and tendencies 
that prevented and those that promoted” the goal of a society that benefits all 
(Marcuse, 1941, p. 321). So Marx’s reformulation of Kant’s question was his 
categorical imperative—the critique of domination and exploitation.  
 
Struggles and political practice 
 
“The materialist protest and materialist critique originated in the struggle of 
oppressed groups for better living conditions and remain permanently 
associated with the actual process of this struggle” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 141). 
“The philosophical ideal of a better world and of true Being are incorporated 
into the practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human 
form” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 142). 
 
<5:> Jürgen Habermas built his approach on the classical Frankfurt School 
and at the same time worked out the concept of communicative rationality, by 
which he went beyond the classical tradition. Habermas distinguishes 
between instrumental (nonsocial, success-oriented), strategic (social, 
success-oriented), and communicative action (social, oriented on 
understanding). Habermas (1987, p. 333) argues that Horkheimer and Adorno 
did not take the discussion of communication into account, “failed to recognize 
the communicative rationality of the lifeworld.” For Habermas, critical theory 
questions that steering media (money, power) attack communicative action in 
the lifeworld. He conceives instrumental action and communicative action as 
the two fundamental aspects of social praxis. What Habermas wants to 
express is that the human being is both a laboring and a communicating being 
and says that the reproduction of life depends on work and 
interaction/communication. Dallas Smythe expressed the same idea as 
foundation of a Marxist theory of media and communication.  
 
For Habermas, emancipatory interest is reflective and enables liberation from 
dogmatic dependence. In those passages where Habermas tries to define 
what critical theory is all about, his formulations remain often rather abstract 
and vague; he mainly points out the emancipatory role of communication and 
that the goal is undistorted communication. He thereby falls behind the 
concreteness of Horkheimer’s, Adorno’s, and Marcuse’s notion of critical 
theory. These thinkers left no doubt that such a theory is all about questioning 
all structures of domination.  
 
Communication is certainly an important aspect of a dominationless society. 
However, communication is, in capitalism, also a form of interaction in which 
ideology, with the help of the mass media, is made available to the dominated 
groups. Communication is not automatically progressive. For Habermas, the 
differentiation is between instrumental/strategic reason and communicative 
reason, whereas for Horkheimer the distinction is between instrumental 
reason and critical reason and, based on that, between traditional and critical 
theory. For Habermas communication is an emancipatory concept confined to 
the lifeworld that is not distorted and not shaped by the steering media money 
and power. Thus Habermas splits off communication from instrumentality and 
thereby neglects the fact that in capitalism communication, just like 
technology, the media, ideology, or labor, is an instrument that is used by the 
dominant system to defend its rule. Communication is not pure and untouched 
by structures of domination; it is antagonistically entangled with them. For 
Horkheimer (based on Marx), critical theory’s goal is man’s “emancipation 
from slavery” (Horkheimer, 2002, p. 249) and “the happiness of all individuals” 
(248). Horkheimer has in mind the emancipation of communication just like 
the emancipation of work, decision-making, and everyday life. His notion of 
critical rationality is larger than Habermas’s notion of communicative 
rationality that risks becoming soaked up by noncritical approaches that use 
Habermas’s stress on communication for instrumental purposes. The concept 
of communication can be critical, but is not necessarily critical, whereas the 
concept of a critique of domination is necessarily critical. 
 
Whereas communication is not necessarily critical and a critical concept, there 
is a tradition of critical theory within media and communication studies: Robert 
T. Craig (1999) points out seven approaches in communication theory. Critical 
theory is one of them, the others are rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, 
cybernetic, <6:> sociopsychological and sociocultural approaches. He 
stresses that critique here means the criticism of domination and ideology as 
well as attempts to change the world for the better by political praxis.  
 
Marxist theory and politics was in the 1920s dominated by structuralist 
approaches that underestimated the importance of class struggle. Young 
radicals were looking for philosophical inspiration in order to renew Marxist 
theory and politics. Some of them, including Herbert Marcuse and Günther 
Anders, felt that Martin Heidegger’s philosophy could help make Marxist 
theory a concrete philosophy. They therefore became his students in 
Freiburg. Heidegger’s book Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] in particular 
influenced these scholars’ thinking and works. Heidegger became a member 
of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in May 1933 and stayed a member until the 
NSDAP was dissolved in 1945. For critical theorists like Marcuse and Anders, 
who were communist and came from Jewish families, Heidegger’s entry into 
the Nazi Party was a big disappointment. Intellectually, they completely turned 
away from Heidegger and argued that his philosophy was only pseudo-
concrete and that the revolution it promised was a Nazi society built on 
nationalism, racism, Führer-ideology, anti-Semitism, and a militant anti-
Marxism suppressing the labor movement. In the introduction to his 1932 
thesis, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der 
Geschichtlichkeit [Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity] that he was 
unable, due to the rise of National Socialism, to defend, Marcuse thanked 
Heidegger. After Marcuse had fled from Germany to the United States, he 
worked on another book about Hegel that was published in 1941: Reason and 
Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. In this book, Marcuse 
mentioned Heidegger only once in a list of National Socialist philosophers. 
This shift in perspective is an indication of how Marcuse’s assessment of 
Heidegger as philosopher and political person had changed. When Marx’s 
Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 were published in 1932, they 
deeply impressed Marcuse. He discovered that a truly revolutionary concrete 
Marxist philosophy could be grounded in the philosophical works of the young 
Marx and did not need Heidegger at all. The question how deeply influenced 
Heidegger’s thought was by National Socialism remained a disputed question. 
On the one hand, there were apologists such as Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Jacques Derrida, or Richard Rorty who felt inspired by Heidegger and 
defended and took up the content of his philosophical works. On the other 
hand, critical theorists, especially Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, 
argued that Heidegger was a fascist and that National Socialism also shaped 
his philosophy. This controversy remains topical even today. New insights 
were gained by the 2014 publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks. In 
these notebooks, Heidegger wrote that Jews were calculating profiteers, and 
would have lived based on the principle of race but resisted the Nazis 
applying this principle to them. He wrote that the Nazis would only practice 
manner what the Jews would have practiced long before them. World 
Judaism would be uprooted and abstract and would not want to sacrifice the 
blood of Jews in wars, whereas the Germans would only have the choice to 
sacrifice what Heidegger describes as the best blood of all—German blood—
in warfare. 
 
Many commentators have argued that these notebooks show once and for all 
that Heidegger was a convinced Nazi, an anti-Semite, and a Nazi apologist. 
They criticize Heidegger for arguing that the Jews were themselves to blame 
for the Shoah. Critical <7:> theory can today only be critical without 
Heidegger. Critical theory is only possible against and in opposition to 
Heidegger and Heideggerians. Those who continue to refer positively to 
Heidegger or argue that these were just unpublished minor remarks become 
apologists for a fascist and anti-Semitic thinker themselves. Questions 
concerning racism, fascism, and anti-Semitism are not minor matters, but are 
for critical theory questions about the totality. Heidegger’s works on 
technology and philosophy continue to influence scholars studying media, 
communication, information, and technology today. A critical theory of these 
phenomena is today also only possible without Heidegger.  
 
3. Critical theory and Karl Marx 
 
The six dimensions of a critical theory of society can also be found in Karl 
Marx’s works, which shows the importance of his thought for any critical 
theory. 
 
Critical theory has a normative dimension 
 
Criticism “measures individual existence against essence” (Marx, 1997, p. 
61f.). This means that critical theory is normative and realistic; it argues that it 
is possible to logically provide reasonably grounded arguments about what a 
good society is, that the good society relates to conditions that all humans 
require to survive (the essence of humans and society), and that we can 
judge existing societies according to what extent they provide humane 
conditions or not.  
 
Critical theory is a critique of domination and exploitation 
 
Critical theory questions all thought and practices that justify or uphold 
domination and exploitation. Marx formulated the categorical imperative of 
critical theory as the need to overthrow conditions that enslave and alienate 
human beings (Marx, 1997, p. 257f.). Critical theory wants to show that a 
good life for all is possible and that domination and exploitation alienate 
humans from achieving such a society. Therefore, for Marx, the “task of 
philosophy … is to unmask human self-alienation” (Marx, 1997, p. 251). In 
deconstructing alienation, domination, and exploitation, critical theory also 
makes demands for a self-determined, participatory, and just democracy. 
Such a society is not only a grassroots political democracy, but also an 
economic democracy, in which producers control the production process, and 
the means and outcomes of production. Critical theory wants to make the 
world conscious of its own possibilities. The “world has long dreamed of 
something of which it only has to become conscious in order to possess it in 
actuality” (Marx, 1997, p. 214). 
 
Critical theory uses dialectical reasoning as method of analysis 
 
The dialectical method identifies contradictions. Contradictions are “the 
source of all dialectics” (Marx, 1867, p. 744). Dialectics tries to show how 
contemporary society and <8:> its moments are shaped by contradictions. 
Contradictions result in the circumstance that society is dynamic and that 
capitalism ensures the continuity of domination and exploitation by changing 
the way these phenomena are organized. Dialectics “regards every 
historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore 
grasps its transient aspects as well” (Marx, 1867, p. 103). The “movement of 
capitalist society is full of contradictions” (ibid.). In a contradiction, one pole of 
the dialectic can only exist by way of the opposed pole; they require and 
exclude each other at the same time. In a dominative society (such as 
capitalism), contradictions cause problems and are to a certain extent also the 
seeds for overcoming these problems. They have positive potentials and 
negative realities at the same time.  
 
Marx analyzed capitalism’s contradictions, for example, the contradictions 
between non-owners/owners, the poor/the rich, misery/wealth, 
workers/capitalists, use-value/exchange-value, concrete labor/abstract labor, 
the simple form of value/the relative and expanded form of value, social 
relations of humans/relations of things, the fetish of commodities and 
money/fetishistic thinking, the circulation of commodities/the circulation of 
money, commodities/money, labor power/wages, subject/object, labor 
process/valorization process, subject of labor (labor power, worker)/the 
means of production (object), variable capital/constant capital, surplus 
labor/surplus product, necessary labor time/surplus labor time, single 
worker/cooperation, single company/industry sector, single capital/competing 
capitals, production/consumption, productive forces/relations of production.  
 
The tension between opposing poles can be resolved in a process that Hegel 
and Marx called “Aufhebung” (sublation) and “negation of the negation”: a 
new/third quality or a new system emerges from the contradiction between 
two poles. Sublation can take place at different levels of society, either 
relatively frequently in order to enable a dynamic of domination or infrequently 
in situations of revolution when domination is questioned. So, in capitalism, 
there is for example a contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. 
The use-value of a commodity is a quality that satisfies human needs; for 
example, movies’ use-value is that they satisfy our need to be informed, 
entertained, and educated. But in capitalism many use-values can only be 
obtained if we pay money for access to them. We can only get access to them 
via the commodities’ exchange-value: we have to enter an exchange of use-
values for money so that a certain quantity of a commodity equals a specific 
sum of money: x commodity A = y amount of money M. Exchange-value in 
capitalist society dominates use-value. So the dialectic of use-value and 
exchange-value in capitalism is that many use-values cannot be accessed 
without exchange-value and the exchange-values mediate use-values; for 
example, Hollywood wants to sell movies in the form of cinema displays and 
DVDs in order to accumulate capital. There are, however, strategies that 
people use to try to resist commodification: for example, a commodity like 
education can be turned into a public service that is funded by taxes and is 
made available to all without payment. Movies in digital format are often 
“pirated” and spread online, so they become pure use-values: hackers sublate 
the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. At the same time, 
those working for a wage in the production of films, music, and other cultural 
goods means that cultural work is a commodity and depends on revenues. 
Therefore cultural workers do not always see downloading <9:> favorably and 
may fear that it deprives them of income. So a new contradiction is created 
between cultural wage work, downloading, and the industry’s monetary profits 
and exploitation of cultural workers. Different forms of sublation have been 
suggested for this contradiction such as the introduction of a cultural flat rate 
for the use of the Internet and culture, royalty systems, or the introduction of a 
basic income for cultural workers. The problem is that capitalism is 
contradictory as such. Therefore Marx sees communism as a society without 
exchange-value that is based on high productivity, automation, free 
distribution of all use-values, and voluntary engagement in the creation of 
use-values. It is a society of use-values that have sublated exchange-values. 
Everyone gets what s/he needs and works according to his/her abilities.  
 
There are also contradictions in capitalism that are persistent and not 
frequently sublated. They are at the heart of human misery in capitalism. Their 
sublation can only be achieved by political struggle that would mean the end 
of capitalism. These are the antagonisms between productive forces/relations 
of production, owners/non-owners, the poor/the rich, misery/wealth, 
workers/capitalists. The contradiction between productive forces and relations 
of production is partly sublated in crisis situations, but reconstitutes itself in 
the crisis. Its true sublation can only be achieved by the overthrow of 
capitalism. If in capitalism an important contradiction is the one between the 
owning class that exploits the non-owning class, then the goal of critical 
theory is the representation of the interest of oppressed and exploited groups 
and the overcoming of class society. “It can only represent a class whose 
historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the 
final abolition of all classes—the proletariat” (Marx, 1867, p. 98). 
 
In formulating a critique of domination and exploitation, critical theory 
develops “new principles for the world out of the principles of the world” (Marx, 
1997, p. 214). Dialectical thinking argues that the foundations of a classless 
society are already developing within capitalism; that capitalism produces new 
forms of cooperation that are within class relations forms of domination. The 
forces of production in capitalism are at the same time destructive forces.  
 
Ideology critique: Critical theory is a critique of ideology  
 
Ideologies are practices and modes of thought that present aspects of human 
existence that are historical and changeable as eternal and unchangeable. 
Ideology critique wants to remind us that everything that exists in society is 
created by humans in social relationships and that social relationships can be 
changed. It wants to bring “problems into the self-conscious human form” 
(Marx, 1997, p. 214), which means that it wants to make humans conscious of 
the problems they are facing in society and the causes of these problems. 
Arguments like “there is no alternative to capitalism, neoliberalism, 
competition, egoism, racism, etc. because man is egoistic, competitive, etc.” 
forget about the social character of society and make it appear as though the 
results of social activity are unchangeable things. Critical theory provides an 
“analysis of the mystical consciousness that is unclear about itself” (Marx, 




Critique of the political economy: Critical theory is a critique of the 
political economy 
 
Critical theory analyzes how capital accumulation, surplus value exploitation, 
and the transformation of aspects of society into commodities 
(commodification) work and what the contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production are. “In the critique of political economy, therefore, we shall 
examine the basic categories, uncover the contradiction introduced by the 
free-trade system, and bring out the consequences of both sides of the 
contradiction“ (Engels, 1843/1844, p. 175). 
 
Critical theory is connected to struggles for a just and fair society; it is an 
intellectual dimension of struggles 
Critical theory provides a “self-understanding … of the age concerning its 
struggle and wishes” (Marx, 1997, p. 315); it can “show the world why it 
actually struggles” and is “taking sides … with actual struggles” (Marx, 1997, 
p. 214). This means that critical theory can help to explain the causes, 
conditions, potentials, and limits of struggles. Critical theory rejects the 
argument that academia and science should and can be value-free. It rather 
argues that all thought and theories are shaped by political worldviews. The 
reasons why a person is interested in a certain topic, aligns himself/herself 
with a certain school of thought, develops a particular theory and not another, 
refers to certain authors and not others, are deeply political because modern 
society is shaped by conflicts of interests and therefore, in order to survive 
and assert themselves, scholars have to make choices, enter strategic 
alliances, and defend their positions against others. Critical theory holds not 
only that theory is always political, but also that critical theory should develop 
analyses of society that struggle against interests and ideas that justify 
domination and exploitation. 
 
4. Critical political economy of media and communication 
 
Critical political economy is an approach within media and communication 
studies that has given special attention to what it means to study society, the 
media, and communication critically, that is, in the context of capitalism, class, 
power and domination, and social struggles. Dwayne Winseck (2011) 
provides, in the introduction to the collected volume The Political Economies 
of Media, a mapping of the landscape of political economy research in media 
and communication studies by identifying four approaches and speaking of 
“political economies of media”: 
 
• neoclassical political economy of the media 
• radical political economy of the media; 
• Schumpeterian institutional political economy of the media; 
• the cultural industries school. 
 
Within Winseck’s second approach, there is no consensus on how to name 
this field. In his seminal introduction to the field, Political Economy of 
Communication, Vincent <11:> Mosco defines it as the “study of the social 
relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including 
communication resources” (Mosco, 2009, p. 2). Graham Murdock and Peter 
Golding (2005) argue that the critical political economy of communications 
analyzes “the interplay between the symbolic and the economic dimensions of 
public communications” (2005, p. 60) and “how the making and taking of 
meaning is shaped at every level by the structured asymmetries in social 
relations” (62). Terms that have been used for naming this field have been 
“political economy of communication,” “political economy of communications,” 
“political economy of culture,” “political economy of information,” “political 
economy of mass communication,” and “political economy of the media.” 
 
The political economy of communication studies media communication in the 
context of power relations and the totality of social relations and is committed 
to moral philosophy and social praxis (Mosco, 2009, pp. 2–5). It is holistic, 
historical, cares about the public good, and engages with moral questions of 
justice and equity (Murdock & Golding, 2005, p. 61).  
 
Important topics of the critical political economy of communication include, for 
example, media activism, media and social movements; the commodification 
of media content, audiences and communication labor; capital accumulation 
models of the media, media and the public sphere, communication and 
space-time, the concentration of corporate power in the communication 
industry, the media and globalization, media policies and state regulation of 
the media; communication and social class, gender, race; hegemony; the 
history of communication industries, media commercialization, media 
homogenization/diversification/multiplication/integration, media and 
advertising, media power. 
 
Karl Marx (1867) titled his magnum opus not Capital: A Political Economy, but 
rather Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Political economy is a broad 
field, incorporating traditions of thinking grounded in classical liberal economic 
thought and thinkers like Malthus, Mill, Petty, Ricardo, Say, Smith, Ure, and 
others that Marx studied, sublated, and was highly critical of in his works. His 
main point of criticism of political economy is that it fetishizes capitalism; its 
thinkers “confine themselves to systematizing in a pedantic way, and 
proclaiming for everlasting truths, the banal and complacent notions held by 
the bourgeois agents of production about their own world, which is to them the 
best possible one” (Marx, 1867, p. 175). They postulate that categories like 
commodities, money, exchange-value, capital, markets, or competition are 
anthropological features of all society, thereby ignoring the categories’ 
historical character and enmeshment into class struggles. Marx showed the 
contradictions of political economy thought and took classical political 
economy as starting point for a critique of capitalism that considers “every 
historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion” and analyzes 
how “the movement of capitalist society is full of contradictions” (Marx, 1867, 
p. 103), which calls for the “development of the contradictions of a given 
historical form” by political practice (619) and means that Marx’s approach is 
“in its very essence critical and revolutionary” (Marx, 1867, p. 103). Marx 
developed a critique of the political economy of capitalism, which means that 
his approach is (a) an analysis and critique of capitalism, (b) a critique of 
liberal ideology, thought, and academia, and <12:> (c) transformative practice. 
Given Marx’s stress on the critique of the political economy of the media, it is 
best to speak of the critical/critique of the political economy of communication, 
culture, information, and the media if a critical approach is meant (as opposed 
to one grounded in liberalism, neoclassical economics, institutionalism, etc.). 
 
Horkheimer’s notion of instrumental reason and Marcuse’s notion of 
technological rationality open up connections between the two approaches of 
the Frankfurt School and the critical political economy of the media. 
Horkheimer and Marcuse stressed that in capitalism there is a tendency for 
freedom of action to be replaced by instrumental decision-making on the part 
of capital and the state so that the individual is expected only to react and not 
to act. The two concepts are grounded in Georg Lukács’s notion of reification, 
which is a reformulation of Marx’s 1867 concept of fetishism. Reification 
means that social relations take on the character and are reduced to the 
status of things so that the fundamental social nature of society gets 
concealed behind things (such as commodities or money).  
 
The media in capitalism are modes of reification in a double sense. First, they 
reduce humans to the status of consumers of advertisements. Second, culture 
is, in capitalism, to a large degree connected to the commodity form, in the 
form of cultural commodities that are bought by consumers and in the form of 
audience and user commodities that media consumers/Internet prosumers 
become themselves. And third, in order to reproduce its existence, capitalism 
has to present itself as the best possible (or only possible) system and makes 
use of the media in order to try to keep this message (in all its differentiated 
forms) hegemonic. The first and the second dimension constitute the 
economic dimension of instrumental reason, the third dimension the 
ideological form of instrumental reason. Capitalist media are necessarily 
means of advertising and commodification and spaces of ideology. 
Advertisement and cultural commodification make humans an instrument for 
economic profit accumulation. Ideology aims at instilling belief in the system of 
capital and commodities into humans’ subjectivity. The goal is that human 
thoughts and actions do not go beyond capitalism, do not question and revolt 
against this system and thereby play the role of instruments for the 
perpetuation of capitalism. It is, of course, an important question to what 
extent ideology is always successful and to what degree it is questioned and 
resisted, but the crucial aspect about ideology is that it encompasses 
strategies and attempts to make human subjects instrumental in the 
reproduction of domination and exploitation. 
 
5. Cultural studies, political economy, and critique 
 
Some cultural studies scholars (like Lawrence Grossberg) argued that both 
the Frankfurt School and political economy have a simple model of culture in 
which people—audiences and consumers—are seen as passive, stupid, 
manipulated cultural dupes. Scholars who say that the Frankfurt School and 
the critical political economy of media and communication are pessimistic and 
elitist and neglect audiences have a simplified understanding of these two 
approaches. Dallas Smythe, for example, had a very balanced view of the 
audience: capital would attempt to control audiences, but they would have the 
potential to resist the powerful and the system of capitalism.  
 
<13:> Some forms of cultural studies have, by rejecting Marxism, faced new 
problems. There is the danger that consumer choice, liberal pluralism, 
consumption as resistance, and commercial culture are affirmed and 
celebrated. If resistance lies in consumption and entertainment and is a 
cultural automatism, then why should people engage in collective political 
action in social movements or political parties? The danger of culturalism is 
that it rejects the importance of the analysis and critique of capitalism and 
class and the interactions of class and domination. The active audience 
hypothesis resulted in the assumption that the media in capitalism create a 
pluralistic society. The limit of this assumption is that there are dominant 
discourses and unequal access to discourses and skills needed for producing 
information and making it visible in the public. The aftermath of the 1968 
social rebellions resulted not just in the emergence of a new left, but also in a 
new radicalism in the social sciences and humanities. The rise of 
neoliberalism weakened the political left and critical social sciences and 
humanities. It was accompanied by a culturalistic turn and the rise of 
postmodern thought, which were intellectual reflections of a new flexible 
regime of accumulation coupled with neoliberal ideology. Both cultural studies 
and critical political economy were influenced by the radicalism of 1968. With 
the rise of the commodification of everything, rebellious ideas too became 
commodities, fashion, and entertainment. The radical character of cultural 
studies was weakened, which is one of the reasons why the late Stuart Hall 
called for a more radical cultural studies that engages with capitalism and 
Marx.  
The logic of determinism that some cultural studies proclaims as being 
characteristic of critical theory and political economy is in fact at the heart of 
the approaches of some of its main representatives. There is no automatism 
that makes humans resist, there is no automatism that culture is interpreted in 
a politically progressive way, there is no automatism that people struggle. 
There is, however, the continuity of capitalism’s attempts to commodify culture 
and of attempts to impose dominant worldviews on people. Both critical theory 
and critical political economy show these tendencies that are largely left out of 
the analysis by many cultural studies scholars. At the same time, critical 
theory and critical political economy see the potential of alternative media 
production and the role of media in struggles and point out the problems and 
limits that alternative media use and that interpretation is facing in capitalism.  
 
6. Critical theory and critique of the political economy of 
communication, culture, information, and the media 
 
Frankfurt School critical theory and the critical political economy of 
media/communication have both developed critiques of the role of media 
communication in exploitation, as means of ideology and potential means of 
liberation and struggle. The largest difference is that the Frankfurt School is 
profoundly grounded in philosophy, especially Hegelian philosophy and social 
theory, whereas the Anglo-American tradition of the critical political economy 
approach has less affinity with philosophy and more grounding in economic 
studies and sociology. Both traditions are valuable and important, and are 
complementary approaches for studying social media critically. 
 
<14:> The globalization of capitalism, its new global crisis, the new 
imperialism, and the role of knowledge and communication in capitalism 
(anticipated by Marx’s notions of the means of communication and the 
general intellect) have resulted in a renewed interest in Marx that should also 
be practiced in media and communication studies (Fuchs, 2016; Fuchs, 2011; 
Fuchs & Mosco, 2012).  
 
The task for a critical theory and critique of the political economy of 
communication, culture, information, and the media is to focus on the critique 
and analysis of the role of communication, culture, information, and the media 
in capitalism in the context of: (a) processes of capital accumulation (including 
the analysis of capital, markets, commodity logic, competition, exchange 
value, the antagonisms of the mode of production, productive forces, crises, 
advertising, etc.); (b) class relations (with a focus on work, labor, the mode of 
the exploitation of surplus value, etc.); (c) domination in general; (d) ideology 
(both in academia and everyday life) as well as the analysis of and 
engagement in (e) struggles against the dominant order, which includes the 
analysis and advancement of (f) social movement struggles and (g) social 
movement media that (h) aim at the establishment of a democratic socialist 
society that is based on communication commons as part of structures of 
commonly owned means of production (Fuchs, 2011). The approach thereby 
realizes that in capitalism all forms of domination are connected to forms of 
exploitation (Fuchs, 2011). 
 
7. Three debates in and about contemporary critical theory 
 
There have been interesting debates in recent years about how to best 
conceptualize critical theory today that will now be introduced: one focuses on 
the relationship of redistribution and recognition, one on the relationship of 
critical sociology and the sociology of critique, and the third on the renewal of 
the critique of capitalism in critical theory. 
 
Fraser and Honneth: Recognition and redistribution 
 
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) engaged in a debate about the role of 
recognition and redistribution in critical theory. The encounter between the 
two philosophers was published as a dialogic book. It focuses on the 
relationship between identity politics and class politics and how critical theory 
should position itself on this question. Nancy Fraser is professor of philosophy 
at the New School in New York City. She has been a leading intellectual who 
has had a major influence on the development of a feminist critical theory. 
Axel Honneth is professor of philosophy and director of the Frankfurt Institute 
of Social Research at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. Some 
consider Honneth to be the successor of Habermas as the leading intellectual 
figure in German critical theory.  
 
Both Fraser and Honneth question the uncoupling of political demands for the 
recognition of identities from demands for redistribution. For Fraser, gender-, 
race-, and class-domination are two-dimensional categories that have 
economic and cultural aspects. For her, all three categories are processes of 
malrecognition of status and maldistribution. Fraser treats economy and 
culture, maldistribution and malrecognition, <15:> as two equal levels of 
society and domination. She sees the two poles as impinging on one another 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 64). Honneth argues that with the exception of 
Habermas and Gramsci, critical theory has had a tendency to anti-
normativism (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p.128f.). Whereas Fraser wants to 
base critical theory on two equal dual categories, redistribution and 
recognition, Honneth looks for a normative monism that is based on one 
central category, the one of recognition. He bases his theory on the 
assumption that humans are psychological beings that strive for self-esteem, 
self-confidence, and self-respect, and suffer if they are disrespected. Honneth 
subdivides recognition into three forms: love, equality, achievement. 
Distribution struggles are for Honneth “a specific kind of struggle for 
recognition, in which the appropriate evaluation of the social contributions of 
individuals or groups is contested” (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 171). 
 
Christian Fuchs (2011, chapter 2) argues for a third version of moral 
philosophy that differs from Fraser’s dualism and Honneth’s monism. 
Redistribution would be the process of establishing a more participatory 
society by redistributing economic resources, power, and definition-capacities 
from dominant groups to oppressed groups. Recognition would be a cultural 
redistribution process of definition-capacities and reputation. For 
understanding recognition, a cultural materialist approach would be needed 
that sees that there can be no recognition without economic redistribution and 
the other way round. Fuchs argues neither for a separation of the concepts of 
recognition and redistribution (Fraser), nor for the subordination of the 
redistribution concept under the recognition concept (Honneth), but for a 
moral philosophy that is based on the notion of redistribution and considers 
recognition as a cultural form of redistribution. 
 
Honneth and Boltanski: Critical sociology and sociology of critique  
 
A second contemporary debate about how to conceptualize critical theory has 
involved Axel Honneth and Luc Boltanski. Boltanski is professor of sociology 
at the  
École des hautes études en sciences sociales (School for Advanced Studies 
in the Social Sciences) in Paris. Boltanski was invited by Honneth to give the 
2008 Adorno lectures in Frankfurt. In these lectures Boltanski (2011) 
distinguished his approach of a pragmatic sociology of critique from critical 
sociology. In France, Pierre Bourdieu in particular would have taken the latter 
approach. But the Marxist tradition can in Boltanski’s view in general be 
described as being close to critical sociology that tries to unmask domination, 
exploitation, and oppression as well as ideologies justifying these phenomena 
(Boltanski, 2011, p. 6). Boltanski describes his approach of the pragmatic 
sociology of critique as “rigorous empirical sociology” (23) that does not 
assume an asymmetry between the sociologist and ordinary people and aims 
to describe the reality and experiences of the oppressed. It would make use 
“of the point of view of the actors …, their ordinary sense of justice, to expose 
the discrepancy between the social world as it is and as it should be in order 
to satisfy people’s moral expectations” (2011, p. 30, italics in original). 
Boltanski criticizes the fact that critical sociology, in his view, has an 
“overarching character” and a “distance at which it holds itself from the critical 
capacities developed by actors in the situations of everyday life” (43). The 
pragmatic sociology of critique would fully acknowledge “actors’ critical 
capacities and <16:> the creativity with which they engage in interpretation 
and action en situation” (43) for “denunciations of injustice” (37).  
 
In a conversation with Honneth (Boltanski & Honneth, 2009), Boltanski points 
out that his approach is not to denounce Marxism, as Bruno Latour does, but 
to take it in a new direction. Just as Boltanski says that in his view Bourdieu’s 
approach saw domination everywhere and failed to see the immanent 
contradictions of society, Honneth says that Habermas, whom he considers 
as his main influence, saw Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach as a total 
critique where everything is domination. The conversation makes clear that 
Boltanski takes an explicitly empirically grounded approach, whereas Honneth 
has developed a moral philosophy. Honneth argues that the reality of actors 
using critical capacities would be unequally distributed so that critical 
sociology would have to analyze the limits that social conditions pose for 
humans (Boltanski & Honneth, 2009, p. 105f.). Boltanski argues that his 
approach is not to use moral philosophy and normative critique, but to 
assume that there are immanent contradictions in reality, that there is always 
something in the world that “goes beyond reality” (107). Boltanski argues that 
ideologies would be something that only those in power needed, whereas 
everyday people would create many experiences that go beyond ideology 
(108).  
 
Boltanski (2011) terms normative critical theory “meta-critical theory” (8) or 
metacritique (6) because it would need an exteriority in order to judge what is 
good and what is bad. He argues for a purely immanent critique that is 
grounded in the empirical observation of how humans experience suffering in 
society and thereby criticize society. Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology of 
critique is purely immanent. Honneth, in contrast, is more skeptical and does 
not see critical capacities developing with necessity in society. He stresses 
the need for a normative critique and a critical theory grounded in immanent 
transcendence.  
 
Honneth distinguishes between a constructive, transcendental critique, a 
reconstructive, immanent critique, and a Foucauldian genealogical critique. 
Critical theory would combine all three forms. In the debate with Fraser, he 
characterizes this combination as immanent transcendence. Transcendence  
 
must be attached to a form of practice or experience which is on the 
one hand indispensable for social reproduction, and on the other 
hand—owing to its normative surplus—points beyond all given forms of 
social organization. … “transcendence” should be a property of 
“immanence” itself, so that the facticity of social relations always 
contains a dimension of transcending claims. (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, 
p. 244)  
 
Fraser sees the immanent element of contemporary society that can 
transcend it in social movements that engage in political struggles (Fraser & 
Honneth, 2003, p. 205), whereas Honneth is very critical of new social 
movements (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, pp. 114–125), considers them as rather 
affirmative, and sees immanent transcendence in an objective morality that 
should be legally implemented in the form of laws.  
  
Dörre, Lessenich, Rosa: Sociology, capitalism and critique 
 
A new development in German critical theory is the emergence of a Jena 
School of critical theory at the University of Jena’s Department of Sociology, 
where three professors <17:> (Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich, and Hartmut 
Rosa) understand their work to stand in the tradition of the Frankfurt School 
and Marx’s critique of capitalism. They want to renew this tradition by giving 
specific focuses to the critical analysis of society.  
 
In a trialogue that was published as the book Soziologie—Kapitalismus—Kritik 
[Sociology—Capitalism—Critique], Dörre, Lessenich, and Rosa (2009) point 
out the commonalities and differences of their approaches. They stress that 
commonalities of their approaches are that “overcoming the system is the 
centre of our critique” (14), that they argue for a critical sociology and want to 
go beyond Boltanski’s sociology of critique (15), and that the sociological 
critique of capitalism would have to be renewed. Their central categories are 
land seizure (Dörre), acceleration (Rosa), and activation (Lessenich).  
 
Klaus Dörre argues that capitalism uses primitive accumulation for the seizure 
of internal and external territories in order to expand. His work is influenced by 
Rosa Luxemburg and David Harvey’s versions of the Marxist theory of 
imperialism. Precarious labor and precarious life would be the consequences 
of a finance-dominated regime of accumulation, which would express itself 
clearly in the austerity measures taken after the tax-financed bailout of banks 
and corporations that happened in 2008 and the years following.  
 
Hartmut Rosa says that sociology’s real subject would be the question about 
what constitutes or harms a good life. Capitalism would be based on the 
logics of growth and acceleration. Modern society would be based on three 
logics of acceleration: technological acceleration, the acceleration of social 
change, and the acceleration of the speed of life. Social struggles would today 
be struggles about performance, that is, to achieve more in less time. 
Acceleration would undermine capitalism’s promise to guarantee and increase 
autonomy. The logic of acceleration would result in ecological crisis, social 
exclusion, and disruption of systems that do not function based on the logic of 
acceleration (such as education, the legal system, and the welfare system). 
 
Stephan Lessenich argues that the state mobilizes and activates humans for 
the purposes of capitalism. There would be a late-modern dialectic of mobility 
and control. He argues for a combination of Marx and Foucault in order to 
understand this phenomenon. He sees it as a crucial task of critical theory 
today to bring the analysis of the state back to social theory. The state would, 
in Fordist capitalism (a form of capitalism based on mass production and 
mass consumption of standardized commodities that was the dominant form 
of capitalism in the 20th century up until the 1970s), have provided absorption 
mechanisms in the form of the welfare state that curbed the negative effects 
of capitalism. Neoliberalism would have reduced these mechanisms and 
resulted in an activating state that defines responsibility in individualistic terms 
as self-care and thereby privatizes the management of social risks.  
 
The three authors mutually criticize each other by focusing on a discussion of 
the approaches’ implications for society and politics. Lessenich argues that 
Dörre formulates a classical social critique by focusing on the critique of 
exploitation, whereas Rosa would formulate an artistic critique by focusing on 
the critique of alienation from others, society, work, nature, things, and one’s 
own body, and that both need to be united.  
 
Lessenich hereby makes use of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) distinction 
between artistic critique—the critique of alienation that calls for authenticity, 
creativity, <18:> freedom, and autonomy—and social critique—the critique of 
class that calls for equality and overcoming capitalism. Boltanski and 
Chiapello argue that the new spirit of capitalism characteristic of the neoliberal 
turn of capitalism has incorporated the anti-authoritarian claims of the 1968 
movement into capitalism so that the outcome was network capitalism.  
Dörre, Lessenich, and Rosa have different sociological perspectives, 
from which they draw differing political conclusions. Yet they stress that what 
unites them is the commitment to critical theory, and that seizure is the 
spatial, acceleration the temporal, and activation the social dimension of “a 
single economic, cultural and political process, whose foundation is 
constituted by the logic of capital movement” (Dörre, Lessenich, & Rosa, 





Habermas once wrote that “philosophy is preserved in science as critique” 
(Habermas, 1971, p. 63). If we want to conduct a critical analysis of the media 
and communication then we require a critical philosophy as foundation. The 
most important critical philosophy tradition is the one that goes back to Hegel 
and Marx. This entry has shown that there are multiple ways of establishing a 
critical theory of society and applying such an approach to the study of media 
and communication. No matter which approach one takes, Marx’s insights 
that class and domination interact and are foundational phenomena of 
modern society should lie at the heart of any attempt that sees itself as a 
critical approach for studying contemporary society and communication in 
contemporary society. 
 
The three contemporary debates in critical theory that were introduced 
focused on the roles of recognition and redistribution, the sociology of critique 
and critical sociology, and the critique of capitalism today. All three debates 
matter for studying media and communication critically.  
 
Fraser and Honneth’s discussion is one about the relationship between 
identity politics and class politics today. This question has shaped the conflict 
between cultural studies and critical political economy in media and 
communication studies. In light of the first world economic crisis in the 21st 
century, it became difficult to ignore the importance of capitalism and class. 
This has led to a return of the economy in cultural studies, although in quite 
different ways that embrace either evolutionary economics, heterodox 
economics without Marx, or Marx (Fuchs, 2014, chapter 3). The crisis has 
shown that inequality is shaping the world today and denies people material, 
political, and cultural recognition that they can only obtain via a redistribution 
of wealth, decision-power, and status. The question of how power, power 
inequalities, and power struggles shape and are shaped by the media is one 
about distribution and redistribution that entails the demands for equality, 
participation, and recognition. 
 
The debate between Honneth and Boltanski, critical sociology and the 
sociology of critique, is one between a more normative and a more empirical 
sociological approach. In media and communication studies (as in other parts 
of the social sciences), we find <19:> a kind of polarization between 
theoretical approaches that focus on theorizing communication and the 
media, and empirical approaches that engage in the observation and 
interpretation of the world through data collection and analysis. On the one 
hand, this situation reflects different traditions, but on the other, it is an 
expression of the fragmentation, individualization, and neoliberalization of the 
university. The university has increasingly been seized by the logic of capital, 
accelerated by the logic of performance measurement, with scholars activated 
to act as individuals and not so much as groups or collectives of scholars. As 
a consequence, there are few space, time, and social possibilities for critique 
and interdisciplinarity that, as suggested and practiced by the Frankfurt 
School, combines philosophy and empirical research in critical studies. Critical 
media and communication studies could under ideal circumstances operate 
as a critical sociology of critique. Such an approach combines critical 
sociology and the sociology of critique. It could be applied for studying media 
and communication in society with the help of a philosophically grounded 
normative critical theory. It could also be used for grounding empirical social 
research into human experiences in the context of mediated and 
communicative inequalities and struggles for equality. Such empirical studies 
could in turn inspire new theoretical knowledge. 
 
Dörre, Rosa, and Lessenich show the fruitfulness of debate between 
colleagues as well as the relevance of critically questioning capitalism. If we 
think of the media and communication, then capitalism is an all-present reality 
in the form of transnational media, communication and cultural corporations, 
media concentration, advertising and consumer culture, the information 
economy, and ideologies. Yet capitalism is only one existing political economy 
of the media. There is also a strong tradition of public service media in parts 
of the world and alternative media connected to social movements and 
activists who want to create a world of communicative, digital, and cultural 
commons. The question of capitalism is a core task for critical media and 
communication studies today. Studies of media and communication inspired 
by critical theory focus on the analysis of information phenomena in the 
context of Marxian topics such as dialectics; capitalism; 
commodity/commodification; surplus value, exploitation, alienation, class; 
globalization; ideology/ideology critique; class struggle; commons; public 
sphere; communism; aesthetics (Fuchs, 2011, 2012, 2014). 
 
SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Class; Gramsci, Antonio; Marxism; Media 
Sociology; Philosophy; Political Economy; Psychoanalysis; Public Sphere; 
Social Criticism; Social Theory; Sociology of Knowledge; Williams, Raymond  
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